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Public division about climate change rooted in conflicting socio-political identities 
 
Of the climate science papers that take a position on the issue 97% agree that climate 
change is caused by humans1, but less than half of the U.S. population shares this 
belief2. This misalignment between scientific and public views has been attributed to a 
range of factors including political attitudes, socio-economic status, moral values, levels 
of scientific understanding, and failure of scientific communication. The public is 
divided between climate change ‘believers’ (whose views align with those of the 
scientific community) and ‘skeptics’ (whose views are in disagreement with those of the 
scientific community). We propose that this division is best explained as a socio-political 
conflict between these opposing groups. Here we demonstrate that U.S. believers and 
skeptics have distinct social identities, beliefs, and emotional reactions that 
systematically predict their support for action to advance their respective positions. The 
key implication is that the divisions between skeptics and believers are unlikely to be 
overcome solely through communication and education strategies, and that 
interventions that increase angry opposition to action on climate change are especially 
problematic. Thus, strategies for building support for mitigation policies should go 
beyond attempts to improve the public’s understanding of science to include approaches 
that transform intergroup relations. 
While there is a growing belief in the general public that climate change is real (with 
over 80% agreement in some U.S. states3, 4), there is a sharp division in beliefs about its 
causes. Yet, if there is to be effective and timely action on climate change, widespread public 
agreement that human activity causes climate change is crucial for building political will. The 
roots of the public divide on climate change (and in particular the persistence of skeptic 
beliefs) have been explained in terms of individual factors such as socio-economic aspects5, 
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moral values6, socio-political orientations and ideologies7, 8, level of knowledge9 and 
scientific understanding of the public10, and personal experiences of climate change11, 12. 
Going beyond individual factors, support for skeptic beliefs has also been attributed to the 
use of lobby groups by vested economic and political factions13, 14 to discredit the scientific 
consensus on climate change15, 16, and to a failure of communication from the scientific 
community to the broader public17.  
While all these factors are important in understanding the persistence of climate 
change skepticism, previous research has not fully considered the possibility that the climate 
change divide is itself an intergroup conflict. We propose that the climate change debate can 
be understood as an intergroup conflict that exists primarily between two groups with 
conflicting views, that is, climate change believers and skeptics (rather than between 
scientists and sections of the public). As such, the public division in opinions about climate 
change can be understood in similar terms to other social conflicts such as that over abortion, 
the campaign for equality of the sexes, the U.S. civil rights movement, and campaigns for 
marriage equality. Although positions in these conflicts are related to, and can emerge from, 
membership of political parties, gender, and religion they are not reducible to any of these 
categories. In relation to abortion, for example, a Republican, male Catholic is more likely to 
be pro-Life than pro-Choice, but the conflict between pro-Life and pro-Choice supporters is 
not a conflict between Republicans and Democrats, men and women, or between Catholics 
and persons with other religious beliefs. Rather, the key defining feature of the pro-Life (or 
pro-Choice) position is a shared opinion, and such opinions provide the psychological basis 
for the intergroup conflict. Although it is very plausible that the climate change divide 
reflects and draws upon partisan and ideological conflicts 8, 14, we consider the possibility that 
it is a conflict that can be understood in opinion-based terms. While believers may tend to be 
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Democrats and skeptics may tend to be Republicans, we ask: can believers and skeptics be 
treated as real groups with distinct identities? 
Although there are multiple shades of opinion about climate change18, we argue that 
there is value in seeing climate change believers and skeptics as conflicting opinion-based 
groups. Opinion-based groups are psychological groups formed around contrasting views 
about what needs to be done about an issue, in this case, climate change19. We propose that 
the contrasting opinions of believers and skeptics about the causes of climate change provide 
the basis of social identities that inform what they, and other people, should do about climate 
change. In particular, these identities drive the forms of social and political action that 
believers and skeptics should take to ensure that their views are supported by policy makers. 
Therefore, we argue that people come to see climate change beliefs and skepticism not just as 
an opinion on an issue, but as an aspect of self that defines who they are, what they stand for, 
and who they stand with (and against). In doing so, opinion-based identities provide a basis 
for collective action as coordinated, collective attempts to bring about, or thwart social 
change19. 
Contemporary models of collective action that integrate psychological (subjective) 
and social (structural) perspectives20, 21 agree that collective action flows from a specific set 
of predictors. Foremost among these are social identification with (or commitment to) a 
relevant group, a sense of grievance or perceived injustice that is expressed as anger at 
opponents, and beliefs that the group can achieve its goals (group efficacy beliefs). There is 
correlational and experimental evidence that group identification predicts environmental 
behaviour and that heightened group-based emotions and perceptions of group efficacy lead 
to an increase in such behavior22, 23, 24, but our interest here is in the role of these variables in 
motivating support for action to advance competing policy positions.   
Given that there are different causal orders proposed by existing models 20, 21 we 
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conceptualize the antecedents of action as an integrated cluster of variables that represent a 
distinct group consciousness24 for believers and for skeptics, each of which predicts 
commitment to action to support the cause they each support. In other words, if identification 
with activists, anger directed at the target of activism, and efficacy of action are measured, a 
factor capturing all these aspects is likely to be a good predictor of collective action 
participation.  
To capture group consciousness we constructed a latent variable with three indicators: 
social identification, anger at the opposing group, and group efficacy beliefs. Group 
consciousness as a skeptic or a believer could be expected to have different political and 
moral foundations such that U.S. believers would tend to have political preferences for the 
Democratic Party and endorse liberal moral values (acting with fairness and avoiding harm) 
and U.S. skeptics would tend to have Republican political preferences and endorse 
conservative moral values of purity, ingroup loyalty and respect for authority25. Specific 
moral foundations have been shown to underpin individuals’ positions towards a range of 
issues including immigration, abortion, and same-sex marriage26 as well as religious 
orientations27. 
In the current study we measured social identification as a skeptic or believer as self-
investment (i.e., positive feelings for and bonds with other group members), group efficacy 
beliefs, anger at the opposing group, party identification (with Republicans versus 
Democrats), moral values (avoiding harm, achieving fairness, loyalty to the ingroup, 
respecting authority and ensuring purity/sanctity), intentions to participate in socio-political 
action in support of the group’s cause, and actual behaviour in support of the cause (a 
donation to an aligned action group as opposed to a neutral charity).  
Using Amazon Mechanical Turk we collected volunteer samples of U.S. citizens who 
were self-declared believers and skeptics. The first step was to determine the validity of 
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categorizing our participants into believers and skeptics by examining the socio-demographic 
and psychological characteristics of the two groups. The descriptive statistics show that the 
two samples were similar in age, education, employment and income (see Table 1). In order 
to characterize our sample in terms of climate change ideology we used the six Americas 
audience segmentation instrument18. Not surprisingly, members of the two groups occupy 
different segments. Specifically, believers were alarmed, concerned and cautious about 
climate change while skeptics were cautious, doubtful and dismissive (tellingly, there were 
no disengaged participants in our samples). Consistent with previous research7, 14 believers 
and skeptics had different political views, with believers more likely to be Democrats or 
uncommitted Republicans, and skeptics more likely to be Republicans or uncommitted 
Democrats. Believers were also more likely to commit to environmental behaviours and to 
express more fear and guilt and less hope about the future of the planet whereas skeptics 
tended to have higher levels of national identification, lower levels of identification with all 
of humanity, and to endorse moral values that were more typical of conservative positions.  
Believers appear to be more invested in their group identity than skeptics, as they were higher 
on opinion-based group identification, group efficacy beliefs, and especially anger towards 
the opposing group and commitment to socio-political action. Research suggesting skeptics 
are less certain28 about their attitudes may explain these differences and presents an important 
line of future research. Given the differences in the psychological characteristics of the two 
groups, we concluded that the participants’ own categorization of themselves as believers and 
skeptics was valid. 
To test a model that included pathways between group consciousness (indicated by 
social identification with the relevant opinion-based group, anger at the opposing group, and 
group efficacy beliefs), socio-political action for skeptics, and also considering moral 
foundations and political party identification as antecedents of group consciousness we 
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conducted structural equation modelling (SEM) using the software AMOS. As expected on 
the basis of the integration of contemporary models of collective action20, 21, 24 we found that 
group consciousness predicted commitment to socio-political action and donations for both 
believers (Figure 1) and skeptics (Figure 2). Despite some small zero order correlations with 
the indicator variables of group consciousness the links between the group consciousness 
factor and moral foundations (avoiding harm and endorsing fairness for believers, and purity, 
authority and ingroup loyalty for skeptics) were not statistically significant in the models. 
However, political party identification was a relevant predictor of group consciousness for 
the believer group but not for skeptics. 
These findings demonstrate that it is plausible to consider the debate between climate 
skeptics and believers as an intergroup conflict. Put another way, believers and skeptics are 
not just people who support different political parties or who hold different positions in a 
scientific debate but are members of opposing sides in a conflict about climate change. 
Moreover, their intended actions, beliefs and hostility to people on the other side of the divide 
could be understood as integrated expressions underpinning specific social identities. An 
integrated cluster of group consciousness factors comprising of identification with these 
groups, anger at the opposing group and beliefs that the group can achieve its goal through 
collective action predicted political action intentions and actual politically relevant behaviour. 
While these results would be expected for activist members of believer and skeptic groups, 
the fact that our sample comprised members of the U.S. general public who were not drawn 
from climate action groups supports the broader applicability of these models and points to 
the depth of social conflict on this issue. 
 More generally, the results support the contention that cultural polarization and 
political mobilization16 are at the core of the climate change divide. Further research would 
fruitfully explore the processes by which these competing groups have formed and by which 
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they grow and are sustained by lobby groups, political messaging and other processes, and to 
clarify the causal order. Our results go further, however, to provide guidance for advocates of 
action on climate change. We note in particular that part of the skeptic group consciousness is 
anger at climate change believers. Antagonizing skeptics and increasing their anger towards 
their opponents (e.g., by suggesting that their beliefs are risible) is likely to rebound by 
making them more committed to take contrary action. On the other hand, efforts to 
undermine group efficacy, for example, by convincing skeptics that their actions are unlikely 
to prevent action on climate change, represent a more plausible path. Similarly, believers’ 
commitment to take action to support mitigation policies can be boosted by strengthening 
their identity and beliefs in the group efficacy of their cause.  
We note that our findings are based exclusively on U.S. data, so they reflect a set of 
specific circumstances and relations that characterize the context in an industrialized, high 
emission nation. There is evidence to suggest that the U.S. context is also different from 
many other countries’ in the strategies that conservative movements use to undermine pro-
environmental attitudes and policies (through aligning themselves with high profile 
skeptics14, 290). Thus, a replication of our study in European countries where many 
conservative parties do not dispute the scientific consensus on climate change is likely to 
highlight other relevant ideological antecedents to group consciousness (rather than political 
party identification). Our model provides a way of considering antecedent factors that are 
known to be associated with climate change positions (political ideology, moral values) with 
the more proximal predictors of intergroup conflict (identity, anger at the outgroup, and 
group efficacy beliefs). As such, it provides a basis for testing structural relations within and 
across different sub-groups, cultures and populations as well as for further exploring the 
differences between believers and skeptics. For example, past research has established that 
believers and skeptics differ in their focus on the climate change debate with believers 
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tending to focus on solutions (e.g., behaviors) whereas skeptics are more likely to focus on 
the definition of the problem (e.g., the debate)8. Despite the stark differences between the 
groups the underlying message of the results is that believers and skeptics are united, but only 
insofar as they are united in opposition to each other. 
Methods  
We conducted an online survey of U.S.-based participants that yielded a sample of 120 climate change 
skeptics and 328 believers (using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk). We examined (a) differences between groups 
both in terms of environmental behaviors, emotional responses, national and global identification, moral 
foundations, and political party identification and, (b) the structural relationships between group identification, 
anger towards the opposing group, political party-identification, moral values, group efficacy beliefs and 
willingness to take socio-political action in support of their group’s cause.  
After a short introduction about the climate debate that included an explanation of what the categories 
skeptics and believers refer to, participants classified themselves as either skeptics or believers depending on 
whether their views were closer to one position or the other. The main variables that we measured were social 
identification (using self-investment as a skeptic or a believer, 10 items, α = .932 for skeptics, α = .923 for 
believers), perceptions of injustice (as anger at the opposing group, 3 items, α = .933 for skeptics, α = .905 for 
believers), group efficacy beliefs (3 items, α = .913 for skeptics, α = .914 for believers), moral values (15 items, 
harm, fairness, ingroup loyalty, respect for authority, and purity/sanctity), political party-identification and 
affiliation (2 items, strength of affiliation with Republicans versus Democrats), and intentions to participate in 
socio-political action in support of the group’s cause (using the same items for both groups, 13 items, α = .946 
for the whole sample). Actual behaviour was measured through giving the participants the option to decide on a 
donation amount of up to one U.S. dollar to be made by the researchers to the Climate Reality project for 
believers, or the Heartland Institute for skeptics. The Climate Reality Project was described to participants as a 
group headed by former Vice President Al Gore that aims to challenge climate change skepticism, while the 
Heartland Institute was described as a group that has been referred to as ‘the world’s most prominent think tank 
promoting skepticism about man-made climate change’. The balance of the $1 would be donated to a non-
climate charity (the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals).  
Other variables include American national identification (10 items, α = .950), global identification 
(identification with all humanity scale, 9 items, α =.899), emotions towards the future of the Earth27 (hope, 
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optimism, despair, fear, worry, remorse, and guilt), and environmental behaviour (support companies that 
reduce emissions, punish companies that do not reduce emissions, use less energy for heating in winter, use 
public transport or car pool, walk or bike instead of driving). Underpinning beliefs about climate change were 
captured through the use of the 6 Americas screening instrument that identifies 6 audience segments (Alarmed, 
Concerned, Cautious, Disengaged, Doubtful, and Dismissive). All measures used in the study are presented in 
detail in the Supplementary Materials.  
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Figures 
 
Figure1. Structural model for believers (p < .05 except where marked ‘a’ when p =.099, and 
‘b’ when p = .324).  N = 328, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .973, RMSEA = .054, 2 (17) = 
33.109, p = .011. Coefficients show the 95% confidence interval around the estimate. 
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Figure2. Structural model for skeptics (p < .05 except where marked ‘a’ when p = .622, ‘b’ 
when p = .349, ‘c’ when p = .381, and ‘d’ when p= .125).  N = 120, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA 
= .000, 2 (21) = 16.400, p = .747. Coefficients show the 95% confidence interval around the 
estimate.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the study sample 
 Skeptics (N = 120) Believers (N = 328) 
Demographic information   
Age (years) 34.2 (10.96) 33.2 (11.22) 
Gender (women %) 41.2 51.4 
Education (tertiary %) 73.3 71 
Income – average or above (%) 65.8 56.7 
Political preference (%)   
Republicans 68.4 17.6 
Democrats  26.6 80.2 
6 Americas segments (%)   
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Alarmed 1 25.6 
Concerned  4 45.9 
Cautious  24.2 25.6 
Disengaged  0 0 
Doubtful  33.3 1.9 
Dismissive 37.4 0.9 
Measured variables (M (SD)) 
Identification  
  
 Identification with all humanity (1-5) 2.78 (0.82) 3.20 (0.78) 
National identification (1-7) 5.33 (1.13) 4.70 (1.32) 
Emotional responses about the future of the Earth’s climate (1-7)  
Hope  4.58 (1.50) 3.80 (1.65) 
Optimism    4.77 (1.54) 3.81 (1.69) 
Despair  2.81 (1.44) 4.06 (1.70) 
Fear  2.77(1.65) 4.43 (1.80) 
Worry  2.93 (1.66) 4.78 (1.70) 
Remorse  2.29 (1.47) 3.55 (1.82) 
Guilt  2.02 (1.25) 3.25 (1.77) 
Group consciousness  (1-7)   
Opinion-based group identification  3.80 (1.16) 4.12 (1.24) 
Collective efficacy beliefs  4.28 (1.36) 4.93 (1.25) 
Anger at the opposing group  2.84 (1.58) 4.10 (1.70) 
Political party identification* (1-6) 4.17 (1.32) 2.55 (1.27) 
Moral foundation scales (0-5)   
Harm/Care  3.12 (0.93) 3.64 (0.82) 
Fairness/Reciprocity  3.07 (0.80) 3.62 (0.79) 
Ingroup/Loyalty   2.69 (0.97) 2.48 (1.04) 
Authority/Respect  2.80 (0.83) 2.49 (1.06) 
Purity/Sanctity  2.62 (1.07) 2.09 (1.35) 
Environmental behaviours (1-7)   
Support companies that reduce emissions 4.40 (1.67) 5.69 (1.24) 
Punish companies that do not reduce emissions 3.62 (1.71) 5.45 (1.50) 
Use less energy for heating in winter 4.84 (1.71) 5.62 (1.39) 
Use public transport or car pool 3.06 (1.88) 4.24 (2.01) 
Walk or bike instead of driving 3.06 (1.82) 4.33 (1.99) 
Socio-political action     
Socio-political action intentions (1-7) 3.13 (1.33) 3.69 (1.36) 
Donation to climate group ($US) 0.46 (0.38) 0.59 (0.33) 
 
Note. *Political party identification was computed on a scale from 1 Strong Democrat to 6 Strong Republican.  
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